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We investigate the effect of institutions on efficiency of training markets. After
setting up a theoretical institutional framework that shows how institutions affect
efficiency, we apply this framework to the real world. An empirical analysis of
institutions affecting training markets will enable us to determine the institutional
efficiency of these markets, under the assumption that a positive relationship exists
between efficiency and productivity. Finally, we compare institutional efficiency scores
of national training markets to other measures of productivity and ask whether a
particular set of institutions maximises efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Many attempts have been made to measure productivity effects of training with no or
unsatisfactory results. Those who succeeded in estimating significant positive returns to
training usually limited their research to wage revenues (e.g. Mincerian wage equations)
and ignored employers’ shares in returns to training. Literature that proxies productivity
by wages often ignores social returns to training as well. Others use sales as a proxy to
output (Bartel (1991 and later); Lynch and Black (1995; 1996)), but data on actual
output are rarely used. Usually, these approaches assume equality of marginal returns to
labour and wages.
Too often, neoclassical theory is applied to research in the field of training, while
interference by government and social partners is bound to bring about market
distortions. An example is Becker (1964) who rejects every possibility of market failure
and denies the occurrence of poaching and hold-up, the argument being that skills are
either specific or general, rather then transferable. Another example is Mincer (1962
and later) who assumes that marginal returns to labour equal wage rates, leaving no
scope for market failures on both training and labour markets. Yet, market failures do
exist. Those who do recognise the existence of market failures, for example new
(endogenous) growth theorists, often see market failures as a consequence of external
effects and tend to overemphasise interference by the government as a remedy to fix
them
1. Yet, non-market failures have to be taken into account as well, together with
tradeoffs between different institutional designs. This means that one needs to consider
training within the institutional framework present in an economy. Furthermore, since
institutional theory assumes the existence of market failures, one is not allowed to
assume equality of wages and marginal productivity.
Therefore, an institutional approach can be a useful alternative to the neoclassical
approach. Building forth upon existent so-called post-Beckerian literature (e.g.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)), we postulate a simple theory of training with scope for
market and non-market failures and a need for institutions to compensate for these
failures.
This paper presents a qualitative method to determine the relative level of efficiency
of a training market, relying on institutional theory. Before doing so, we need to select
those institutions that are relevant to training markets, because the number of
institutions that exist in an economy are seemingly indefinite. A number of criterions
has to be satisfied for an institution to be relevant to the training market and as such to
be included in our framework. Institutions have to be characteristic of their
environment; be stable, i.e. exist sufficiently long to be effective; and exercise actual
influence on economic behaviour with regard to human capital.
We will present a number of possible institutional characteristics of training markets.
Each characteristic brings about particular effects, such as transparency of the market
and budget accountability.  Policy makers and other creators of the institutional
environment of an economy have to be aware of these institutional effects because they
affect dynamic, product, and cost efficiency. We will show that institutional design may
imply a trade-off between different forms of efficiency.
                                                
1 Husz (1998, p. 40) discusses the standard model for endogenous growth and shows that in such a model
the accumulation of human capital is typically suboptimal, which makes a policy instrument for education
necessary.3
In an empirical investigation, we make a comparative institutional analysis by
applying the theory to three training markets. We analyse institutions as observed on the
German, Dutch and British training markets. First, we describe training policies in the
three countries. This results in an overview, a profile, of national institutional
environments with relevance to training markets. Once we have an overview of
institutions present on the training markets, we classify these institutions in accordance
with the theoretical institutional framework. We connect these observed institutions to
efficiency as prescribed by the framework. In this way, we determine an efficiency
score for each national training market. Although these efficiency scores indicate the
rank of a country rather than an absolute measure of efficiency, the scores should
predict economic performance of a country relative to other countries, in terms of
productivity and returns to training.
As a final step, we compare these efficiency scores with several measures of human
capital productivity, in an attempt to confirm our theory. The more efficient firms are,
the higher their labour productivity is; the more efficient training institutes are, the more
effective training is, in terms of returns to training and labour productivity. We expect
to find a positive relationship between efficiency scores, which result from the
institutional framework, and labour productivity, human capital productivity, and output
elasticities of labour and human capital.
To compare institutional efficiency scores with other measures of efficiency, we
calculate technical efficiency indices, using the thick frontier procedure. We apply this
procedure to a production function, which is estimated from sectoral data. Our data
include actual output, rather than a proxy, labour input, and several measures of human
capital.
Accordingly the theoretical institutional framework and the comparative institutional
analysis based on that framework, we claim that Germany has a generally efficient
training market, whereas the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are relatively
inefficient. The United Kingdom has a particularly low score on dynamic efficiency.
British technical efficiency as calculated from our econometric results, however,
appears to be higher than German technical efficiency, whereas Dutch technological
efficiency is even higher. Therefore, we tend to conclude that even though institutions
facilitate well-functioning markets and institutions may affect productivity, there is no
ex-ante efficiency maximising set of institutions.
2 Framework for Comparative Institutional Analysis
Before doing the actual analyses, we need to create a theoretical framework that
defines the connection between institutions and returns to training. Before setting up the
framework, we need to make a number of assumptions. First, people tend to create a
virtually unlimited number of institutions, a relatively small number of which is actually
relevant to the training market.
Second, most institutions consist of other institutions. This means that we can group
institutions together into sets and still call these sets institutions. To distinguish the
larger sets of institutions and other institutions that constitute them, we will speak of
institutional characteristics and institutions. Institutional characteristics are sets of
institutions that affect the functioning of the training market through equal mechanisms
and can therefore be grouped together as one institution.4
Third, the mechanisms through which institutions affect efficiency are called
institutional effects and are distinguished from efficiency effects. We observe the
following institutional effects: external flexibility, internal flexibility, transparency,
diversity, internalisation of external effects, commitment, equity, economies of scale,
accountability, and contractability. Some of these institutional effects can be directly
traced back to the overview of training policy in paragraph 3. Most institutional effects
are discussed in institutional literature such as CPB (1997), Hassel and Rehder (2001),
Williams (1999), Dercksen et al. (1993), Vrancken and De Kemp (1996), Stevens
(1996), Kessler and Lülfesmann (1999), Williamson (1985, 1996) and Teulings and
Hartog (1999). For a more extensive discussion of institutional effects, we refer to
Schonewille (forthcoming, chap. 2).
Fourth, although institutions are usually designed to lift market failures, they often
cause new inefficiencies, which we call non-market failures
2. When creating new
institutions, policy makers have to be aware of these side-effects. Since lifting market
failures enhances efficiency while new non-market failures cause inefficiency, there is a
trade-off connected to every institution.
Fifth, efficiency can be considered in three different ways. There is dynamic
efficiency, which considers investments aimed at future returns. There is also allocative
efficiency, which determines whether inputs are allocated over production possibilities
in such a way as to maximize output. The third type of efficiency is cost efficiency,
meaning that a given amount of output is produced with a minimum amount of
resources. Efficiency effects are the result of institutional effects and determine the
values of the three types of efficiency.
Table 1 Relations between institutional effects and three types of efficiency
Institutional effect Efficiency
dynamic efficiency allocative efficiency cost efficiency
external flexibility - + o
internal flexibility o o +
transparency + + o




commitment + o +
equity - - -
scale economies + - o
accountability o + +
contractability + + o
-  negative relation; +  positive relation; o no (clear) effect
                                                
2 The existence of trade-offs between different institutional designs due to market failures and non-market
failures is one of the basic assumptions made by CPB (1997).5
The relationships between institutional effects and efficiency are discussed by
Schonewille (forthcoming). External flexibility facilitates exchange of labour units
between firms. Internal flexibility enhances job mobility within the firm. Transparency
makes information about training and qualifications easier to obtain and thus reduces
risks involved in investments in human capital. Diversity causes a “survival of the
fittest” and enhances competitiveness, and thus investments, as long as “the fittest” is
not a monopolist. Internalisation of external effects makes investors aware of the actual
cost of their investment, meanwhile allowing them to claim all returns. Commitment
reduces risks involved with investments and reduces information asymmetry. Equity
reduces competitiveness and cost-awareness and usually is a political rather than an
economic choice. Scale economies directly increase the returns to an investment.
Contractability reduces risk involved with an investment. Non-contractability is a
consequence of information asymmetries, which cause non-transferability of skills
(Stevens (1996) and Schonewille (forthcoming)). Increasing transferability affects job
mobility positively. Table 1 gives an overview of the connection between institutional
effects and the three types of efficiency.
















+ + - + +
Restriction in
qualification system




+ - - + +
Control & guarding of
examination standards
+ o - + +
Quantity
Obligatory participation
of firms in programmes
(e.g. training funds)
o o + o +
Public finance of job-
related training
+ - + - o
o no effect; - negative effect; + positive effect.
Tables 2 and 3 show the institutional effects of every institution that we distinguish
on the training and labour markets. Table 2 contains the institutions that are relevant to
employee-employer relations. Table 3 contains those that are relevant to
educator/investor relations. Investors can be employees and employers.6
The institutions included in the tables are the result of theoretical and empirical
analyses (Schonewille (forthcoming)). An institution is only relevant if there is a
theoretical, or hypothetical, connection with efficiency and empirical research shows
that the institution actually exists on the labour or training market of a country.













+ o o o o
Restriction in
qualification system
+ - + + o
specialisation of
institutes
+ - o + o
Contents
Control & guarding of
examination standards
+ - o + +
Quantity
Obligatory participation
of firms in programmes
(e.g. training funds)
+ o o o o
public finance of job-
related training
+ - + + -
Organisation and finance
merging institutes + - + + -
price competition o o - - +
output-based finance o o + o +
lump-sum finance o + + o +
o no effect; - negative effect; + positive effect.
Clear definitions of qualifications mean that the qualification system is not
inconsistent and that everybody, especially employers and trainees, can understand the
definition of every qualification. Restrictions imposed on the qualification system
prevent the number of qualifications growing unlimitedly and keep the market
transparent. Specialisation means that individual institutes offer a limited number of
qualifications and courses. Employees having a say in business decisions, including
investment in training and personnel policies, may strengthen the career-based nature of
investments in training and prevent skills from becoming very task-based. Control over
examination standards makes sure that trainees obtain the skills in accordance with the
definitions of qualifications. Firms being obliged to finance and participate in sectoral
or national training schemes reduces free riding effects, poaching, and offers a solution
to the prisoners dilemma with respect to training investments.7
Public financing has a positive effect on investments and uniformity of training, but
may cause overinvestments and neglect special needs of firms. Moreover, firms are
likely to exploit the public budget. Merging institutes directly enhance transparency and
obviously have a positive effect on scale economies. Price competition reduces costs,
because institutes are free to buy secondary services from the cheapest supplier and
have to offer their training services at the lowest possible price as well. Lump-sum
financing forces institutes to stick to the budget and to keep costs low.
Having selected institutions that potentially affect efficiency of labour and training
markets, we can now combine the theoretical framework with an empirical analysis. We
need to know to what extent these institutions actually exist in the countries subject to
our research, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We do this by
observing a number of institutional characteristics. These characteristics are derived
from our empirical analysis and extensively discussed by Schonewille (forthcoming).
Once we have determined the presence of institutions, we can link institutional presence
and institutional effects to efficiency and calculate total institutional efficiency by
country. The institutional efficiencies can be used as hypothetical values and are
compared to more traditional efficiency measures to test the theory.
3 Two Decades of Training Policy
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has a four decades history of vocational education and in-firm
training. In 1964, the Industrial Training Act received the royal assent, which induced
the establishment of a Central Training Council and Industrial Training Boards (ITBs).
The ITBs had to foster training in individual industries. Government, employers
organizations and labour unions had common responsibility in the central Training
Council. Since every firm was free to pursue its own training policy, however, the
designation “Central” is virtually meaningless.
In the 1980s and 1990s, attempts were made to enhance quality and quantity of
vocational education and continuing training (CEDEFOP (1999)). These attempts aimed
at a number of measures. First, more efficient allocation of financial resources, for
example by establishing the Industrial Training Boards (ITBs). Second, stronger
effectiveness by quality enhancing measures, such as accreditation of courses by means
of the NVQ system and reformation of the executive Councils and Agencies. Third,
more efficiency by means of financial incentives, for example achievement-related
finance. These measures, however, have not removed the skills gap. Qualifications are
still task-based and narrowly defined, while vocational qualifications at higher
educational levels hardly exist. There are NVQ qualifications at higher educational
levels, but there is, except for technical colleges which offer a mixture of general and
vocational education (Jarrat, Murphu and Lawry (1997)) no complete higher education
system as it exists in the Netherlands and Germany. The fact that vocational education
is hardly offered at higher levels could be one of the causes of the continuing skills gap.
Apart from the measures described in this paragraph, one should note that policy
sometimes pursued increasing responsibility of the national government and sometimes
increasing freedom of local organizations.8
Education in the United Kingdom is the responsibility of the Local Education
Authorities. LEA’s are local, elected bodies responsible for all publicly financed
educational facilities in their region
3. Besides LEA’s, there are the Funding Agencies
for Schools (FAS) in England since 1988, and the Welsh Office in Wales. There are no
LEA’s in Northern Ireland, where Education and Library Boards have been established
instead. There is no special body for financing special (independent) schools, because
there are only very few of those schools (CEDEFOP (1995)). Schools that are financed
by the FAS are not under supervision of a LEA but under the control of their own
governing board. The FAS does not interfere in policies of individual schools and
hardly plays any role in local training policy.
Since LEA’s are local organizations, they have an important decentralizing effect on
the market of education and training. They also strengthen decentralization because they
take the needs of entrepreneurs in their region as their starting point. They don’t have to
take account of labour surpluses and skill shortages in neighbouring regions. This
brings about heterogeneity on the initial education market, because skills available to
the local market are different in every region. Heterogeneity can be observed on the
local market for continuing training as well, by consequence of the local orientation of
the TECs.
The local orientation of TECs and LEAs may contribute to the heterogeneity and
intransparency of the British education and training market. Qualifications as demanded
by firms and supplied by potential employees are different in every region. Although
the LEAs became less prevalent during the 1990s, the problem of heterogeneity and
intransparency has not been reduced, because staff, parents and firms were given more
control over local education. For instance, governing boards of educational institutes
received more responsibilities. Furthermore, part of the curriculum is still decentrally
determined.
In the United Kingdom, initial education is largely general rather than vocational.
The share of students in lower vocational education is low relative to those in the
Netherlands and Germany (Eurostat/Eurodyce (1997)).
Although the government’s training policy became less strict during the 1970s, firms
were still obliged to invest in schooling and training. Training policies of the ITBs was
mainly directed at large firms. Consequently, small firms and thus a large group of
employees did not benefit from ITBs’ support, while it is this group which participates
in training infrequently
4.
Furthermore, according to Williams and Goodwin (1999), only off-the-job training
was supported, while employers expressed a preference for on-the-job training. The UK
LFS shows that employees participated in general training more often than specific
training, in both large and small firms. In large firms, 7.4% of employees participated in
continuing education, whereas 6% of employees in these firms participated in training
                                                
3 One often speaks of Local Authories (LA’s) rather than LEA’s. LA’s are all elected public bodies at
local level.
4 In 1983, the UK Labour Force Surbey asked employees about firm size, for the first time. This allows us
to calculate that in small firms (<25 employees) 3% of the emplyees participated in a job-related course,
whereas 6% of employees of large firms participated. Similarly, 12% of employees of small firms
participated in any form of education, whereas 16% of employees of large firms were in education. It is
remarkable that ITBs concentrated on a very small group of employees who participated in training
relatively often.9
offered by the firm; in small firms 5% participated in continuing education and 3.3% in
training offered by the firm
5.
In the early 1970s, a central training programme was considered a necessity.
Apparently, there was the opinion that the Central Training Council was improperly
organized. In 1973, this problem was dealt with by issuing the Employment and
Training Act, followed by the establishment of the Manpower Services Commission,
which was replaced by the Training Agency in 1988. Meanwhile, increasing
unemployment demanded a special programme for unemployed youngsters, which was
launched under the name of the Youth Training Scheme. People who participate in the
YTS work in a temporary job and spend 25% of their time on training. While the new
programmes were introduced, old structures were broken down and by the end of the
1980s all ITBs had disappeared. The influence of the unions, still present in the ITBs,
had disappeared as well.  Training policies of the 1980s were dominated by the national
government, LA’s and individual employers. Coordination between social partners and
government, either on national or sectoral level, was almost completely absent and
employees were involved in policy design concerning schooling and training no longer.
Because training was mainly the national government’s responsibility now, she was
able to conduct a strong national training policy from the 1980s onward, under direct
supervision by the Employment Department. Surprisingly, as a first step, it was decided
to decentralize British training policy by delegating responsibility to local Training and
Enterprise Councils (TECs), although the Employment Department kept final
responsibility. After a period of centralization, a tendency to decentralization existed
right after the process of centralization had finished.
More important may be that only a tenth of TEC’s total budget was used for job-
related training. Aalders (1994) claims that financial support by the government was
insufficient, that annual budgeting rather than long-term policy caused strong
uncertainty, and finally that TEC’s conducted too strict a policy. Firms probably know
best what they need and find themselves only hindered by strict regulation.
In 1986, a new important programme came into being, next to the existing YTS,
namely the National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs). These qualifications were, and
still are, awarded by so-called awarding bodies, under supervision of the National
Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ). The new system facilitated deregulation
and was assumed to help creating a competitive market for training. The most important
goal of the NCVQ was to integrate existing qualifications and organizations into the
new system, including the School Curriculum Assessment Authority (SCAA), the
School and Assessment Authority for Wales (ACAC) and the YTS as well as the
Business and Technology Education Council (BTEC). Williams (1999) gives an
illuminating view of these training systems and explains why the system failed (also see
Vickerstaff (1988)). Briefly, organisatory complexity, intransparency of the
qualification system and a lack of incentives to innovation and learning are causes of
failure of the NVQ system (Schonewille (forthcoming)).
There are also indications of employees’ interests being neglected, since neither
individual employees nor labour unions were able to influence training policy in the late
1980s and onwards. This could be a reason why NVQs are task-based, i.e. directed at
working with a particular machine or performing one particular service, rather then
based-based. Robinson (see Goodwin (1999)) states that the NVQ system does not
                                                
5 Calculated from the UK LFS by the author.10
function as expected, because it did not replace existing qualifications (also see:
Spielhofer 2000 and 2001).
NVQs have not brought about a coherent qualification system, but merely added
another set of qualifications, only increasing confusing and intransparency. The NVQ
system alone counts more than 800 different qualifications. This is more than twice the
number of qualifications in the German Dual System. Adding the number of Scottish
Vocational Qualifications (SVQs), the total amount of British qualifications becomes
even much bigger. It is not clear that equally defined qualifications really imply equal
skills. This causes lack of clarity amongst employers and trainees. The intransparency
of the NVQ system also appears from the fact that the number of qualifications to be
defined was unknown when the system was created. Originally, one expected to define
a possible number of 2000 qualifications (Prais (1995, p. 31)). Although the total
number of qualifications never reached such a height, the YTS and the SVQ and NVQ
systems together count more than 1600 different qualifications. The government always
strived for as large assortment as possible. When a reduction of the number of
qualifications was proposed, the initiative always lay with parties having a commercial
interest, such as firms and TECs
6.
A problem of NVQs is to be found in time-apprenticeship. A large share of NVQs is
awarded on the basis of the length of the training period rather than the actual skills
acquired by the trainee.
It is not always clear that qualifications obtained in Northern Ireland are equal to
those acquired elsewhere in the United Kingdom, because the YTS in this part of the
country has different names.
Germany
The current training system is the result of a process which started halfway the 19th
century, when the German railways and other firms founded special working places,
Werkstatten, for trainees. Although the Dual System finds its roots in the 19th century,
it received official recognition not earlier than 1953. An employment act, the
Gewerbeordnung of 1869, defined the status, rights and obligations of trainees, usually
craftsmen at the start of their career (CEDEFOP (1981, p. 177)). At the beginning of the
20th century, special arrangements were added to this law, considering trainees in
manufacturing (Handwerk) and trade and the working places in the manufacturing
sector.
Already at the beginning of the 19th century, an attempt was made to coordinate the
different training forms that existed in Germany. The goal was a number of consistent
uniform programmes proving training for clearly defined professions. From 1925
onwards, organized employers defined qualification requirements for every profession
that was included in the German Arrangement for Technical Education (DATSCH).
Eventually, the DATSCH included approximately 1000 different professions. Five
years later, examination standards were defined and shortly thereafter these
qualifications were officially recognized by the minister of education. Nowadays, there
are approximately 3000 different professions provided for by the Law on Vocational
Education (BBiG), which replaced the DATSCH in 1969.
                                                
6 This has been confirmed by the Qualification and Curriculum Authority, the umbrella organization
responsible for accreditation of the larger part of all NVQs.11
Meanwhile, employees were involved in the process of defining professions and their
respective qualifications. Consequently, social partners play an important role in the
development of the German vocational education and training system.
Besides national legislation regarding firm-based training, in particular the BBiG,
there is also legislation at the level of the Länder. The Länder are responsible for the
school system with regard to finance, housing and equipment, educational methods, and
personnel for instance. This allows for regional diversity, while the market for skilled
labour is still transparent. While schools compete on quality of education, all pupils
throughout the country acquire uniform qualifications.
The Dual System is equally organized in every industry and in every region of the
country. This is possible because it is the federal government that is responsible for
implementation of the BBiG.  Accordingly the BBiG, pupils start with theoretical
lessons in Fachschulen and continue their education in one or more firms. In the firm,
they receive on-the-job training while they continue to attend theoretical courses as
well. In this way, one may obtain lower qualifications, equal to those of Facharbeiter, in
one of thirteen professional areas. The number of officially recognized professional
areas has not changed during the past 30 years and their definitions are almost
completely unchanged as well (see CEDEFOP (1981, p. 169) and CEDEFOP (1995, p.
100)). In 2002, the number of vocational qualifications that can be acquired in the Dual
System has been reduced from 452 to 350 (CEDEFOP (1981) and Bundesministerium
für Bildung und Forschung (2003, p. 134)).
Fachhochschulen often closely cooperate with firms to provide for these firms’ needs
for training (Weihrich (1999)). Flexibility on the labour market is high, because pupils
receive on-the-job training and therefore acquire knowledge as demanded by firms and
because technical schools adjust their courses accordingly the need of employers.
Although the Dual System is uniformly organized, its implementation has been
largely decentralized. At the level of the firm, it is the social partners who determine
regional education policies. besides a few administrative tasks, they define standards,
monitor pupils’ performance and control actual training contents. They also organize
examinations (Aalders (1994, p. 105)).
The German education and training markets are very transparent. Qualifications and
examination standards are always defined at national level, which facilitated planning of
school careers by pupils and which make it easier for employers to assess employees’
qualifications. At regional level, however, there still is sufficient diversity to enable
schools to compete on quality and facilities.
Netherlands
Early 20th century, there was no separate vocational education in the Netherlands.
This country did not build upon its long tradition of on-the-job training, which was
quite similar to the German training system at the time. In the Netherlands, internal
firm-based courses had always been an important source of vocational skills. Just like
Germany, the Netherlands finds the origin of its firm-based training system in the
medieval ages. Yet, it appears that the transformation of a 19th century training system
into a modern system occurred less smoothly than in Germany. A reason is the fact that
social partners took account of the development of a training system themselves,
whereas this was a task for the government in the Netherlands. The Dutch government12
focussed on class-based education rather than workplace-based training. From the start
of the 20th century onwards, Dutch vocational education contained many general
components. When the Dutch training system was officially launched, it also included a
dual system, besides a class-based system (see Wolthuis (1999)). After World War II,
the importance of this dual system increased significantly, because the need for
technically skilled employees raised. In the 1970s, when services gained weight and
general education became more important again, mobility between the dual system and
general education was improved.
From 1980 onwards, the Dutch government conducted a policy aimed at reducing
government expenses. Education was one of the sectors facing a major budget cut
(OESO (1991, p. 18)). During the 1990s, the component of general education increased,
because all schools were obliged to offer exactly the same programme during the first
two years, including history, mathematics, housekeeping and other subjects. After 1993,
the Dutch education and training markets have been continuously subject to change and
reform.
The Wagner Commission (1984) had great influence on the development of Dutch
vocational education and training. The commission recommended to strengthen the
connection between initial education, continuing education and the labour market.
Regarding initial vocational education, social partners became more influent in several
commissions who served as advisors to the government. They made recommendations
considering sectoral professional profiles and defined clear training goals. Six years
later, the Commission Rauwenhof recommended to provide more opportunities for
vocational education institutes to cooperate with firms and to engage in commercial
activities themselves. These recommendations have had great influence on the course of
events during the 1990s.
In 1996, the new Education Law (WEB) induced more reforms (Steering a Course
for BVE (MinOCW (2000)). The WEB is by far the most important law considering
secondary education and vocational education and training. The law replaced nearly all
previously existing laws with regard to this subject (CEDEFOP p. 14-15)).
The current Dutch structure of vocational qualifications is considered transparent by
the Steering Group for Evaluation of the WEB (2001). However, the Group states that
only educational institutes have a good overview of their opportunities. Pupils and
trainees would have problems getting a clear view of the vocational qualification
system.
The reforms of the Dutch educational system have a great impact on both the initial
educational sector and continuing training. one of the goals of the WEB is to rationalize
the unstructured pattern of educational institutes. Early 1998, 1900 secondary schools
had merged into 46 Regional Education Centres (ROCs), which continue to merge
(CEDEFOP (1999)). These mergers are supposed to induce transparency on the
education and training markets and economies to scale. Currently, the public sector for
initial and continuing education and training is very transparent: only 43 ROCs provide
for the larger part of continuing vocational education and training. The remaining part
of CVT is provided by 200 private training institutes and within firms (also see
CEDEFOP (1999).
Another measure to enhance efficiency was to delegate responsibilities from
centralised coordinating organizations to institutes at microlevel. In this way, financial
accountability was increased and institutes experienced incentives not to exceed the
available budget.13
Introduction of the WEB also changed supervision over examinations. Now, ROCs
bear main responsibility for examinations. Representatives of social partners and the
government (National Bodies for Vocational Education, the Council for Vocational and
Adult Education, the COLO, and the educational inspectorate) all have influence on
education and training policies. It is expected that the WEB will reinforce the position
of trainees, i.e. trainees and employees will be (better) able to influence organization
and contents of job-related training.
The ROCs are stimulated to engage in commercial activities. Every ROC has to
develop its own entrepreneurial strategy, which is supposed to lead to competitiveness
and regional diversity. Competition is hampered, though, by local authorities who are
compelled to buy training services for the underprivileged on the labour market from
the ROCs.
By consequence of the apparent distinction between training for employees and
training for other market segments, training for employees is financed exclusively by
the private sector, an exception being the O&O (Research and Education) Funds, which
are partly subsidized by the national government. O&O Funds are also used to finance
part of the Dutch dual system (Leerlingwezen), which means that these funds buy
training services at the ROCs. O&O Funds account for a minor share in total Dutch
training investments.
Part of firm-related training is organized by sectoral organizations. There are sectoral
organisations that offer training by themselves, such as BOVAG, there are also
organisations, e.g. CEDEO, that certify courses offered by other private organizations.
Generally, there are no obligatory requirements that have to be satisfied by suppliers of
training services. Organisations that don’t receive recognition or certification can still
be present on the training market.
Effectiveness of the Dutch market for education and training was studied by the
MDW group (2001). Transparency was one of the criteria for effectiveness. The MDW
group stated that, although serious attempts were made to enhance transparency of the
Dutch schooling and training markets, the Dutch markets are still perceived as
intransparent. However, according to the group, the cause of intransparency appears to
be an information problem rather than the qualification structure itself.
Continuing change of the Dutch training market during the 1990s caused risks and
uncertainty. Consequently, firms and employees may tend to postpone investment in
training and education until policy becomes less volatile.
Final Remarks about Training Policies
In the United Kingdom in the second half of the 20th century, training policy was
inconsistent, due to the temporary neglect of vocational education followed by a policy
to foster continuing training. Another inconsistency was the tendency to centralisation
followed by decentralisation.
In Germany and the Netherlands, training policy was more consistent. Germany has
a long tradition of vocational education and training. De government always had
relatively strong influence, but initiative lay with the social partners. In the Netherlands,
also having a long tradition of vocational education and training, initiative lay with the
government and social partners were closely involved with training policy. The
transition to a well-structured training system at the beginning of the 20th century did14
not take place as smoothly as in Germany, exactly because it was the Dutch government
that took initiative. Most of the Dutch reforms occurred during the last 20 years and it is
not clear to what extent these changes are going to be permanent. It is possible that
some of the changes will be cancelled and that more reforms will take place. Therefore,
although Dutch training policy cannot be judged inconsistent, it is definitely less stable
than German training policy.
The result of this empirical analysis is presented in the appendix. For every of the
three countries, a table shows which institutional characteristics are present. A more
extensive discussion of how the empirical analysis gives us the results as given in the
appendix is provided by Schonewille (forthcoming).
4 Efficiency According to CIA
In this paragraph, we link market failures to inefficiency, taking actually existing
institutions as our starting point. First, we observe the extend to which an institution is
present in a country. As an illustration, we show how we obtained the score of
Restrictions in the Qualification System. According to our theory, this institution has a
relatively small number of causal relationships with efficiency. This makes the example
easy to understand.
Schonewille (forthcoming) claims that Restrictions of the Qualification System are
mainly affected by two characteristics of the training market: the number of available
qualifications and the diversity of available courses. Schonewille concludes that the
relatively small number of 350 qualifications indicates a sense of restriction. Therefore,
a moderate positive contribution (+1) of this characteristic to the presence of the
institution Restrictions of the Qualification System is observed.
Schonewille also claims that diversity of courses is increased by institutions enjoying
the freedom to decide by themselves which courses they will offer, while no deliberate
attempt is made to maximize this diversity. The characteristic of diversity of courses is
thus observed having a neutral (0) effect on Restrictions of the Qualification System.
We assign scores to institutions accordingly to the contribution characteristics make
to their presence. These scores range from –2 up to and including +2. The scores
assigned to characteristics is referred to as Ifg, where the subscript f=1,2,...F represents
the characteristic and g=1,2,...G stand for the institution. By adding up the scores of the
characteristics Number of qualifications and Diversity, we get a score for the institution




å = I1g + I2g = 1+ 0 = 1 (1)
The next step is to use table 1 to determine the connection between institutional
effects and Restrictions of the Qualification System. In this example, we only consider
institutional effects which are important to the training market. According to
aforementioned table, the existence of restrictions affects transparency, equity and
economies to scale positively (+1) and diversity negatively (-1), while the effect on
accountability is neutral (0). Institutional effects are also assigned scores, ranging
between –1 and 1. The result is a vector F, which reflects the connection between15
institution and institutional effects. This vector can be written as follows (institutional































The last preparatory step is to write down all relationships between institutional
effects and efficiency in such a way that we can do calculations with them. Table 1
shows how institutional effects are connected to dynamic, allocative and cost efficiency.
The table shows, for instance, that transparency, diversity and economies to scale
contribute positively to dynamic efficiency, that equity has a negative effect on dynamic
efficiency, while accountability is neutral. Assigning scores to these relationships, we
can create a matrix MD.
MD =
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 -1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0


















We can create similar matrices showing the relationship between institutional effects
and allocative efficiency MA and cost efficiency MC
7.
Now, we can calculate how every institutional effect of Restrictions of the
Qualification System affects dynamic efficiency. We do so by multiplying the number
Ifg, the vector F and the matrix MD as shown in equation (4).
Xg = IgMmF, mÎ{A,C,D} (4)
The result is a new vector Xg, containing five efficiency values. This vector is shown in
































                                                
7 If we define M*m=[mnk|p=q,0<p£Q] as elements on the diagonal of PxQ matrix Mm, we can write
M*D=[1 1 –1 –1 0], M*A=[1 0 –1 –1 1] en M*C=[0 0 1 0 1].16
This process is repeated as many times as there are institutions connected to
institutional effects that are relevant to the training market. Table 3 show that there are
10 institutions affecting the training market. For each institution, we can calculate a
vector Xg. The total effect on dynamic efficiency of the German training market,
distinguished according to each individual institutional effect, is calculated by adding


































This vector can be traced back in table A.1 of the appendix. This table consists of three
panels. Panel 1 refers to Germany. Lines 6 up to and including 10 of column 1 of the
first panel, which shows indices with regard to dynamic efficiency, contain the same
numbers as shown in equation (6). Using these numbers, one is able to compare
countries by efficiency. We can also use these numbers to do more calculations, the
results of which are shown in tables 4, 5, and 6, all based on the figures in table A.1.
Table 4 Institutional effects on efficiency of labour and training markets
Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
dynamic efficiency 10 3 -11
allocative efficiency 29 2 -19
cost efficiency 7 1 16
Source: calculated from table A1, A2, and A3 in the appendix.
Table 4 shows that Germany has generally high institutional efficiencies. Table 5 and
6 show that Germany performs very well in terms of allocative efficiency, on both the
training and the labour market. Cost efficiency on the labour market is the only area
where Germany performs worse than the two other countries.
Table 5 Institutional effects on efficiency of training markets
Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
dynamic efficiency 8 0 -12
allocative efficiency 14 -3 3
cost efficiency 9 -2 6
Source: calculated from table A1, A2, and A3 in the appendix.
The British training market exhibits, just like the British labour market, a highly
varying profile, as is shown by tables 5 and 6. The training market of the United
Kingdom is dynamically inefficient, while this country has higher cost and allocative
efficiency than the Netherlands, while lagging behind Germany in these respects.17
Table 6 Institutional effects on efficiency of labour markets
Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
dynamic efficiency 2 3 1
allocative efficiency 15 5 -22
cost efficiency -2 3 10
Source: calculated from table A1, A2, and A3 in the appendix.
In view of the institutional efficiencies presented here, it is difficult to set up a
hypothesis with respect to more traditional measures of efficiency. Given the high
dynamic and allocative efficiency in Germany, one would expect to find high efficiency
for this country if other measures are uses as well. Yet, given the relatively high British
cost efficiency, one might expect that German and British product efficiency are not
very different. The Dutch position is clearly different from that of the other two
countries. Therefore, we expect to find a Dutch value for technical efficiency that is
clearly different from the values observed for the other two countries.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
Because the empirical institutional analysis may be sensitive to subjectivity, we
investigate how small changes in the assigned indices affect our conclusions. We use
equation (4) as our starting-point. This equation contains three major components. The
empirical component is Ig, the extent to which institutions are present. The other two
components, effects F and contributions to efficiency Mm, are theoretical. Changes in
vector Xg can accordingly be divided into empirical and theoretical components,
respectively DIg and F
TMm (see equation 7).
DXg = DIg ×MmF (7)
We can apply changes to the empirical component by setting DI unequal to zero,
under the condition that Ig+DIg Î {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2}.
In the remainder of this section, we will only consider the consequences of changes
in Ig. There are three reasons for doing so. First, although one might be able to observe
the presence of an institution objectively, the interpretation of the institution by the
observer still affects the value of Ifg. Second, the values of F are based on institutional
literature and often there is consensus about the institutional effects and the trade-offs
that are connected to institutions. The values of M rely on literature, too. These two
components are thus less sensitive to subjectivity than Ig. The third reason is that F
TMm
together represent the theory that we want to investigate the usefulness of. Those who
support a different theory may want to change F and M. Since we are concerned with
the theory presented in the preceding sections, we keep F and M fixed.
We use a reference country, which is the “average” of the other three countries.
Since the indices are assigned to institutions in comparison to institutions in other
countries, all indices are relative. The reference country is characterized by Ig=0. Table
7 shows the effects of changes in the assigned indices. The first column contains
institutions, the second column contains the characteristics that constitute the18
institutions. The next three columns show the consequences of a change equal to DIg=1,
by characteristics and each of the dynamic, allocative and cost efficiencies.
Table 7 can be considered by institution or by type of efficiency. It appears that some
institutions are relatively insensitive, such as output-based finance and specialisation of
institutes. Although output-based finance increases equity and accountability (see table
3), these effects largely compensate each other. Only dynamic efficiency is affected
negatively by this institution, because output-based finance has a positive effect on
equity, which in turn negatively affects dynamic efficiency.
Table 7 Effects DX due to changes DI=1 in the presence of institutional characteristics







Price competition Financial responsibility 0 -3 -2








Status and supply of
training
1 3 1
Public finance of job-
related training
Public investments 0 -1 -3
Public finance of job-
related training
Participation 0 -1 -3
Output-based finance Financial responsibility -1 0 0
Stable policy Participation 1 1 -1
Stable policy Tradition 1 1 -1
Stable policy Stability 1 1 -1
Restrictions in
qualification system






Specialisation of institutes Nature of training supply 1 0 0
Relative influence
employees/employers
Supply of vocational skills 0 2 -1
Relative influence
employees/employers
Social partners 0 2 -1
Guarding examination
standards
Coordination: standards 1 3 1
Guarding examination
standards
Time apprentices 1 3 1
Obligatory participation in
training programmes
Participation 3 2 1
Merging of institutes Nature of training supply 0 -2 -2
The figures in the table indicate the size of the effect on institutional efficiency of a changing
institutional characteristic. The table can be calculated using equation (4) and tables 1, 2 and 3.19
Allocative efficiency is both positively and negatively related to specialisation of
institutes (see table 3). On the one hand, specialisation mainly has a positive effect on
transparency, which is positively connected to both dynamic and allocative efficiency
(see table 7). On the other hand, scale economies, which are also positively affected by
specialisation, are negatively related to allocative efficiency. Consequently, the effect of
specialisation on allocative efficiency equals zero. Since specialisation has a negative
effect on diversity and diversity is positively related to dynamic efficiency, is also the
contribution of specialisation to dynamic efficiency relatively small.
An institution with relatively large influence is Obligatory participation in training
programmes. This large effect is caused by the non-negative relation of all three types
of efficiency with each of the institutional effects of this institution. incorrect
interpretation of this institution will have major consequences. Fortunately, clear and
well-documented information is available about this institution
8, leaving little scope for
subjectivity.
Clear documentation with regard to output-related finance is less abundantly
available (Schonewille (ibid.)). Therefore, interpretation plays an important role and the
influence of subjectivity may be large. The effect DI=-1 on dynamic efficiency due to
subjectivity, which may occur according to table 7, is sufficiently small to avoid a
significant effect on the relative position of the three countries. Moreover, the theory
does not recognize a connection between this institution and allocative and cost
efficiency. So, these two types of efficiency are supposed to be insensitive to
subjectivity with regard to output-based finance.
Considering table 7 by types of efficiency, we observe that allocative and cost
efficiency are strongly affected by a number of individual institutional characteristics,
e.g. Public finance of job-related training and Guarding examination standards.
Dynamic efficiency is thus relatively insensitive to subjective assignation values to
individual institutional characteristics. This clearly appears from table 8. For each type
of efficiency, we have calculated the average change in the absolute value of the
contribution |DX| of each institutional effect. This contribution to efficiency is largest
for allocative efficiency, namely 1.6, slightly smaller for cost efficiency equalling 1.3,
and smallest for dynamic efficiency amounting to no more than 0.7 (see table 8). This
means that the absolute value of the average differential |DX| is largest in the case of
allocative efficiency. Table 8 also shows the variance of DX. The variance indicates that
the allocative efficiency does not only have the highest average, but also that individual
values of this type of efficiency have the highest deviation from the average value.
Subjective observations of institutional characteristics can therefore have major
consequences for the observed value of allocative efficiency.
The size of the error possibly caused by incorrect interpretation of an individual
characteristic is between –3 and 3. These are the minimum and maximum values in
table 7. The distance between these values equals 6. This distance is too small to change
the relative position of a country in such a way that we have to adjust our conclusions
with regard to total efficiency indices, as the distance is always less than or equal to the
efficiency differences between the three countries. There is only one case where the
                                                
8  Schonewille (forthcoming, section 3.3.1) dicsusses some of the literature on Obligatory participation in
training programmes.20
maximum possible error might neutralize the total efficiency difference, namely the
case of cost efficiency of Germany and the Netherlands (see table 9 col. 5).
Tabel 8 Sensitivity of X to changes in I
Dynamic efficiency Allocative efficiency Cost efficiency
var(DX) 0,884211 3,628947 1,852632
average |DX| 0,7 1,55 1,3
S(Dx)
2/N 1,052632 3,736842 2,315789
Calculated from table 7 Var(DX) indicated the change in efficiency due to a change in the
presence of an institutional characteristic. The average of |DX| is the average of the absolute
values of  changes in efficiency. The third row shows an alternative expression of efficiencies
deviating from 0.
Considering the training market and labour market separately, we find the analysis to
be more sensitive to subjectivity. Incorrect interpretation of an individual institutional
characteristic could imply different conclusions with regard to the relative efficiency of
the British and German training markets, because the difference in efficiency between
the two countries equals 3 and is thus less than the maximum possible error. It also
appears that dynamic efficiency of the labour market is particularly sensitive to
subjectivity, because the distances between the values of dynamic efficiency of the
labour markets do not exceed 2 and are thus smaller than the maximum possible error.
Tabel 9 Absolute afstand tussen efficiëntiewaarden












Germany 8 20 17 11 11 3
Netherlands - 12 - 6 - 8
Labour markets
Germany 1 1 10 37 5 12
Netherlands - 2 - 27 - 7
Total
Germany 7 21 27 48 6 9
Netherlands - 14 - 21 - 15
Source: calculated from tables 4, 5 and 6.
The expected effect of the “average” error may be more important the effect of an
individual interpretation error. The total effect of DI on dynamic, allocative and cost
efficiency equal 8, 17 and –16 respectively. These numbers are the sum of the columns21
of table 7. The expected sigh of an error due to subjectivity is positive in the cases of
dynamic and allocative efficiency, but negative in the case of cost efficiency.
“Over-estimation” of the presence of an institutional characteristic causes over-
estimation of dynamic efficiency as well as allocative efficiency of a country, whereas
cost efficiency would be under-estimated. “Under-estimation” of the presence of an
institutional characteristic obviously causes opposite effects. Of the three types of
efficiency, dynamic efficiency has the lowest sensitivity to under- and over-estimation.
Over-estimation of the presence of an institutional characteristic means, in case of
the United Kingdom, that the profile of that country is too similar to the profile of the
Netherlands. If subjectivity indeed influences our analysis, the distance between the
Dutch and the British profiles should be larger than reflected by our tables. Under-
estimation would have an opposite effect, implying that the actual profiles of the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands are more similar than appears from our analysis.
Under- and over-estimation of the presence of institutional characteristics causes the
profiles of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to be more, or less, similar than in
reality. Yet, Interpretation errors cannot cause the observed German profile to converge
with the profiles of the other two countries. The only possibility is that German
allocative and dynamic efficiencies approach to, or move away from Dutch and British
values, while cost efficiency moves in the opposite direction.
The preceding considerations show that subjectivity may cause difficulties,
particularly with regard to labour markets. Efficiency indices of particularly dynamic
efficiency  may give an incorrect view of labour markets. Subjective interpretation of
individual institutional characteristics does not, however, affect our conclusions with
regard to efficiency of training markets. Nor are total efficiency indices of labour and
training markets together affected in such a way that our conclusions are deemed to be
unreliable.  The effect of subjective interpretation on the analysis as a whole does not
cast any doubt on our results. It is possible, though, that the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands are more, or less, similar than appears from this analysis.
6 The Thick Frontier Procedure
We use the thick frontier procedure to estimate the technical efficiency of an
economy. Currently, this and similar techniques are frequently used in research on
efficiency of banks ( e.g. Lozano Vivas (1997) and Bikker (2003)). A more extensive
discussion of frontier procedures is provided by Coelli (1997). The result of the thick
frontier procedure is a series of efficiency indices that indicate the distance between the
actual production set of a country and the common production possibilities frontier of
the three countries together.
The model to be estimated in the next paragraph is based on a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function. The only major adjustment is that we divide both sides of
the production function by the size of the sectoral labour force. For the thick frontier
approach, we use a simple OLS equation with output per labour unit Y/L as dependent
variable and assuming constant returns to scale. In this model, we include three
variables representing job-related training, namely with lags of zero, one and two
periods. Furthermore, we add a trend variable en a series of sector and country dummies
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where Yijt is output of sector i in country j in period t, Kijt is capital stock, L is the
number of employees, and A refers to total factor productivity. Initial education is
represented by Sqijt and job-related training, measured as participation, by Vijt-T
(0£T£2). The term ûijt,tot is de total error, i.e. the difference between the actual values of
Y/L and the values as predicted by the estimated model. The coefficients q’q and t are
labour productivity elasticities of respectively initial education and job-related training.
After estimating above regression equation, we can distinguish efficient and
inefficient industries. We assume that industries with a high error ûijt,tot are efficient.
Every industry is assigned a value Dijt,ineff, which equals 1 if ûijt,tot is smaller than the
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The dummy explains the component of the error term which is due to inefficiency.
De remaining error term ûijt,rand only contains a random error without industry and
country specific effects and is not affected by inefficiency. Now, we can calculate
which part of uijt,tot is due to inefficiency, using the following equation:
ˆ  u  ijt,ineff =
0
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(11)
Te increase readability and to facilitate interpretation of the results, we recalculate
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(12)
TEijt is the technical efficiency of industry i in country j in period t.23
7 The Data
The data come from a number of sources. The British education and training data
have been derived from the UK Labour Force Surbey (UK LFS). Sectoral employment
for each of the three countries was calculated by estimating sectoral employment shares
from a labour survey and multiplying these shares by the total number of persons in the
working population of the respective countries. The shares were estimated using data
from the UK LFS, the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP) and the Dutch labour
supply panel of the Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). Total annual employment
figures are from Eurostat.
The length of the time series is limited by availability of the data. The start of the
series is determined by the point in time when surveyors started asking consistent
information about education and training. This 1988 in the United Kingdom, 1984 in
Germany, and 1986 in the Netherlands. The end of the series is determined by the
ISDB, which was not continued after 1997, and by reforms of the surveys which would
make data inconsistent if the most recent data were included in our own data set.
The data contain annual observations for Germany and the United Kingdom. The
number of Dutch observation is further reduced by the fact that the OSA panel is
conducted only bi-annually, in even years.
We have divided initial education into three categories, lower, secondary, and higher
education, making educational data as comparable as possible. The lower category is
not included in the equation to keep the variables independent.
While Schonewille (2001) applies a trend correction to all series, we have decided
not to do so. Instead, the regression equation includes a time variable to take account of
trend effects. Apart from a slightly different specification of the regression equation,
this is causes our results regarding the United Kingdom to be different from the results
published by Schonewille (2001). This means that a considerable amount of
multicolliniarity affects our estimates, especially amongst the training variables, but the
coefficients are not skewed by a trend correction procedure.
Another difference between the results presented by Schonewille (2001) and the
results following below is that we have omitted a distinction between on-the-job and
off-the-job training. Instead, we have measure total participation in training. This is the
only way to proxy training investments in all three countries in a consistent way,
because all surveys use different training measures.
The variables as used in the estimated regression equation are all measured at sector
level and are defined as follows. Output is measured as gross value added. Capital
equals accumulated investments in physical capital, calculated by the OECD. Output
and capital stock data were derived from the OECD International Sectoral Database
(ISDB). Labour is the number of employees working in a sector, estimated using the
above described procedure. The three initial education variables denote the sectoral
employment shares of the respective education levels. Higher education is defined as
university and non-university degree level qualifications. Intermediary education
includes secondary education, up to and including pre-university level. Lower education
includes those workers who have not obtained any secondary education qualifications.
Some of these workers may have obtained no more than a certificate of the YTS, for
instance.24
Table 7 Production functions without and with efficiency dummy


























































































Efficiency dummy (dineff) - -0,614**
(-16,43)
The sector Other is reference sector and the United Kingdom is reference country. The efficiency
dummy has been included in model in the right-hand column, which means that the coefficient dineff does
not appear in the original model. One asterisk (*) means that the coefficient is significant at 90% while
two asterisks (**) means that a coefficient is significant at 95%. De labour coefficient can be calculated
as a=1-b.25
8 Thick Frontier Results
Table 10 shows the estimates of above production functions. The column on the left
shows the estimates of the original equation, whereas the column on the right contains
the estimates of the extended production function which included the inefficiency
dummy. The technical efficiencies which are the result of the estimated models are
shown in table 11.
Table 11 Technical efficiencies accordingly the thick frontier method
Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
Production sectors 0,63 0,89 0,74
Service sectors 0,72 0,59 0,65
Entire economy 0,69 0,74 0,69
Source: error terms of the extended model and recalculated using equation (11).
According to the procedure followed in this paragraph, the Netherlands is the most
efficient country of the three. Although Germany is a country of heavy industry, it
shows good performance in service industries, while the Netherlands perform badly in
these industries. The United Kingdom is relatively inefficient if its economy as a whole
is considered, but appears to keep a modest position if the figures concerning services
and production industries are considered separately.
9 Conclusions
Our comparative institutional analysis predicts that the Netherlands is moderately
efficient in all three respects studied in this paper. On the training market, Germany has
higher efficiency indices than the other two countries, whereas the United Kingdom has
a low index for dynamic efficiency. The labour market shows a high score for allocative
efficiency in Germany and a low score for the United Kingdom. According to this
analysis, the United Kingdom performs rather well in terms of cost efficiency on the
labour market.
The frontier procedure shows that the Netherlands produces most efficient, while
Germany and the United Kingdom lag behind by approximately 5 percentage points.
Although Germany is an industrial country, the efficiency of its production sectors is
lower than those of the other two countries, while the efficiency of its service sectors is
higher. This might tell us either that we need to be careful interpreting the results of the
frontier procedure, or that the comparative advantage of each of the three countries is
not due to efficiency.
The Dutch moderate institutional efficiency indices could be connected to the Dutch
high technical efficiency scores. Concentrating equally on institutions that equally affect
all three forms of efficiency may positively affect technical efficiency, which we could
take as a hypothesis for further research. Since there is no striking difference between
the German and the British technical efficiency scores, we cannot conclude that
concentrating on a particular kind of institutional efficiency positively affects technical
efficiency. Neither can we state that there is an ex-ante set of institutions clearly
enhances technical efficiency. We can only postulate a new hypothesis, that equally
concentrating on all three types of efficiency may have a positive effect on technical
efficiency.26
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Appendices
A.1 Scores by institution in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
A.1.1 Germany
Effects Dynamic Eff. Allocative Eff. Cost Efficiency
External flexibility -5 5 0




Commitment 7 0 7
Contractability 10 10 0




Equity 4 4 4
Scale economies 2 -2 0
Accountability 0 5 5
A.1.2 Netherlands
Effects Dynamic Eff. Allocative Eff. Cost Efficiency
External flexibility -2 2 0




Commitment 2 0 2
Contractability 3 3 0




Equity 1 1 1
Scale economies -2 2 0
Accountability 0 -3 -330
A.1.3 United Kingdom
Effects Dynamic Eff. Allocative Eff. Cost Efficiency
External flexibility 10 -10 0




Commitment -6 0 -6
Contractability -12 -12 0




Equity 6 6 6
Scale Economies -14 14 0
Accountability 0 0 031
A.2 Presence of institutions in Germany, the Netherlands and the United










Number of qualifications -1 0 -2
Clear definitions at national
level
Definitions of qualifications 1 3 1
Clear definitions at national
level
Status and supply of
training
1 3 1
Specialisation of institutes Nature of education supply -1 0 0
Relative influence
employees/employers
Social partners 0 2 -1
Obligatory particip- ation of
firms in existing
programmes
Participation 3 2 1
Public finance of job-related
training
Public investments 0 0 0
Output-based finance Financial responsibility 1 0 0
Price competition Financial responsibility 0 3 2
Relative influence
employees/employers
Supply of vocational skills 0 0 0
Stable Policy Tradition 2 2 -2
Control & guardening of
examination standards
Coordination: standards 1 3 1






Stable policy Participation 0 0 0
Stable policy Stability 2 2 -2
Merging of institutes Nature of education supply 0 2 2
Public finance of job-related
training
Participation 0 1 3
Control & guardening of
examination standards










Number of qualifictions 2 0 4
Clear definitions at
national level
Definitions of qualifications 1 3 1
Clear definitions at
national level
Status and supply of
training
0 0 0
Specialisation of institutes Nature of education supply -1 0 0
Relative influence
employees/employers
Social partners 0 4 -2
Public finance of job-
related training
Public investments 0 0 0
Output-based finance Financial responsibility 1 0 0
Price competition Financial responsibility 0 -3 -2
Relative influence
employees/employers
Supply of vocational skills 0 2 -1
Stable Policy Tradition 0 0 0
Control & guardening of
examination standards
Coordination: standards 1 3 1






Stable policy Participation -1 -1 1
Public finance of job-
related training
Participation 0 0 0
Obligatory particip- ation
of firms in existing
programmes
Participation 0 0 0
Stable policy Stability -1 -1 1
Merging of institutes Nature of education supply 0 -2 -2
Control & guardening of
examination standards










Number of qualifications 1 0 2
Clear definities op
nationaal niveau
Definitions of qualifications -1 -3 -1
Duidelijke definitions at
national level
Status and supply of
training
1 3 1
Specialisation of institutes Nature of education supply 0 0 0
Relative influence
employees/employers
Social partners 0 -2 1
Public finance of job-
related training
Public investments 0 1 3
Output-based finance Financial responsibility 0 0 0
Price competition Financial responsibility 0 0 0
Relative influence
employees/employers
Supply of vocational skills 0 -2 1
Stable Policy Tradition -2 -2 2
Control & guardening of
examination standards
Coordination: standards -1 -3 -1






Stable policy Participation -1 -1 1
Public finance of job-
related training
Participation 0 1 3
Obligatory particip- ation
of firms in existing
programmes
Participation -6 -4 -2
Stable policy Stability -2 -2 2
Merging of institutes Nature of education supply 0 4 4
Control & guardening of
examination standards
Time apprentices -2 -6 -2